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Although it is well known that the market rate of return tends to show negative 
skewness, we find that the return distribution of individual stocks has shown positive 
skewness in the two principal Tokyo markets from 1980 to 2001. This is consistent with 
the results reported for the US market. Positive skewness in the returns is more evident 
for smaller firms.  
From our analysis of pooled cross-section data of individual stocks from 1990 to 
2001, we find that there is clear evidence of the predictive power in the information up 
until the current period for the skewness in the following period. Specifically, a higher 
volatility and skewness in the return distribution of the current period is followed by a 
higher value of skewness in the following period. Also, the up trends in own returns in 
the preceding periods may explain the rather negatively skewed return distribution in 
the following period.  
Hong and Stein’s (2003) model predicts a relation between turnover and 
skewness. For 1990 to 2001, negative relation to the skewness has been found to hold 
for smaller cap firms with past de-trended turnover. Furthermore, after the regulatory 
change in short-selling enacted in February 2002, we find more supportive evidence that 
high trend-adjusted turnover predicts more negative skewness in returns. Overall, our 
empirical evidence suggests that conditional skewness is partly explained by previous 


















Forecasting Skewness in Stock Returns:  





In this paper, we first examine whether the return distribution of individual stocks in 
Tokyo’s two principal markets is described by log-normal distribution, as often 
modeled, and then investigate the mechanism to cause the asymmetry found in the 
return distribution with reference to the model of Hong and Stein (2003) of investor 
heterogeneity with institutional frictions.  
     It may be possible that the distribution has either positive or negative third 
moments, as reported by the literature on the US capital markets. Although it is 
extensively reported that the market rate of return tends to show negative skewness, the 
return distribution of individual stocks in Tokyo markets has not yet been documented 
in detail to our knowledge. Duffee (1995) and Chen, Hong and Stein (2001, referred to 
as CHS (2001) hereafter) reported positive skewness of individual stock return 
distributions for the US market, and our data may exhibit similarities in firm-level stock 
returns distributions as well. We are also interested in the difference among firm-size 
groups.  
As to the mechanism causing the asymmetric return distribution, there are 
competing hypotheses such as those based on leverage effects, a volatility feedback 
mechanism, and stochastic bubble. These studies mostly focus on asymmetric volatility 
and its relation to returns. Empirical findings are also extensively discussed in the 
literatures such as Beckaert and Wu (2000) both at firm- and market-level. With regard 
to more general aspects of asymmetry and other anomalous cross-sectional evidence in 
return distributions, the models which combine mild assumptions about investor 
irrationality with institutional frictions are offered.1 Among the belief-based models, 
Hong and Stein (2003) presented an interesting theoretical model of investor 
heterogeneity with institutional frictions. Their model predicts a relation between 
turnover and skewness. To be specific, their model predicts that markets may exhibit 
asymmetric return distributions in higher order conditional moments if some agents are 
short-sale constrained in their trading activity despite the existence of different opinions 
on the intrinsic value of stocks. Empirical work by CHS (2001) was done using US data 
based on this model. We examine their hypothesis in detail using the data from 1980 to 
2001 in Tokyo markets.  
Since we have a good opportunity in Japan to test the effects of a change of 
regulations on short-selling in stock trading, which was enacted in February 2002, we 
focus on the effects of tighter short-sale constraints as well. The results we obtained 
show that the institutional framework affects the return distribution and its conditional 
moments to some extent.  
Our analysis of pooled cross-section data of individual stocks will show clear 
evidence of predictive power in the information preceding time  for the skewness in 
period . Specifically, the greater the volatility and skewness in the current period, 
the greater the value of the skewness in the following period. Also, the up trends in own 
t
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1These developments are surveyed in Barberis and Thaler (2003). 
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returns in the preceding periods may explain a rather negatively skewed return 
distribution in the following period. On the other hand, the effects of the trading 
variables as proxies for differences in opinion in the preceding period seem to be not so 
robust as such other variables as own skewness, volatility, and cumulative rate of return. 
Still, systematic relations to the skewness were evident in trading variables for 
small-cap firms in the 1990s through 2001.  
Theoretical investigation as to why firm-level returns data show positive 
skewness and the underlying economic mechanism to explain this asymmetry is a great 
challenge for study. In reality, heterogeneity of agents inclusive of differences in 
preferences and information play an important role in ensuring active trades in the 
markets (Kandl and Pearson (1995)). From this viewpoint, the models of heterogeneous 
agents are attractive to explain asymmetries observed in the markets.  
In the following sections, the patterns of the return distributions are carefully 
examined. Analysis to identify the causes bringing about the asymmetry in the 
firm-level return distribution is presented in Section 4, and robustness tests are in 




2  Framework of Analysis 
 
2.1 Definitions of the Variables 
 
This section defines the variables used in our analysis and explains the data source. 
Stock price data are the daily prices of the non-financial corporations listed on the first 
and second sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. These are Japan’s two principal 
exchanges in terms trading activity and number of listed stocks. Based on daily price 
data, individual stock returns are defined as excess return over that of the TOPIX 
market index. Using market-adjusted return allows us to focus on the factors associated 
with individual stocks.  
     Specifically, the market-adjusted daily return of stock ,i iRτ , is defined as the log 
change in the stock price less the log change in the market index; daily returns for firm 










⎛ ⎞τ= −⎜⎝ ⎠
,⎟  (1) 
where iPτ  is the closing price of stock  on i thτ day of the entire sample data 
sequence for firm .  i
     For each firm i , data are sub-grouped according to six-month periods denoted by t . 
These are either April to September or October to March, to be consistent with the usual 
accounting periods for Japanese corporations. We also tested with the data sets 
consisting of January through June and July through December; almost similar results 
were obtained as those reported here. In later sections, we also use the groupings of 




2.2 Measure of Skewness 
 
To measure the skewness of the return distribution, two alternative variables  
and  are defined, following research by CHS (2001).
itSKEW
itDUVOL
2  is the degree 
of the skewness of daily stock returns for the firm  measured over the six-month 
period . Specifically,  is calculated by taking the sample third moment of daily 
returns, and dividing it by the sample standard deviation of daily returns  
raised to the third power. Thus, for any stock  over any six-month period t , we have 
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−= +∑ , which is the mean return for stock  during the period . 
A positive value of  corresponds to a distribution skewed to the right.  
i t
itSKEW
The second variable to measure the asymmetry of stock returns is  
which is the up-to-down variance ratio. This is computed as follows: for any stock  
over any six-month period , we divide our samples into two sub-groups, one with 
returns below the period mean (’down’ days) and those with returns above the period 
mean (’up’ days), and compute the standard deviation for each of these sub-samples 
separately. We then take the log of the ratio of the standard deviation on the up days to 
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n I R R−= += −∑  and 1 1 (it itSd itit ill Sn I R−= += )R−∑  respectively.  
A higher value of  means that daily returns are more positively skewed, 
corresponding to a more right-skewed distribution. Because we only use the second 
itDUVOL
                                                 
2In CHS (2001), , is defined as the negative of  as defined in this paper. NCSKEW SKEW
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moment of the returns when we calculate , the variable  is less 
affected by outliers in the sample than .  
itDUVOL itDUVOL
itSKEW
To check the impact caused by outliers, we also calculate  and  
as follows;  
itDMA itDOUT
 itit itDMA MEDIANR= − ,  (5) 
 
where MEDIAN  refers to the sample median of the return distribution and itR  is 
defined as above.  measures how the return distribution is shaped 
asymmetrically. On the other hand, if the shape of the distribution is affected by small 
numbers of large outliers, this possibility should be captured by , which is 
calculated by counting the number of outliers. Outliers are defined as data with values 
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where ( )I X  is an index function. Since  and  are more sensitively 
affected by the number of outliers, a large positive value of  corresponds to 
having more observations in the right end of the distribution.  
itDMA itDOUT
itDOUT
     In calculating the above variables, we drop any six-month period  from the data 
set if stock  has more than six missing observations of daily returns.
t
i 3  
 
2.3 Cumulative Returns and Trading Volume 
 
We also define four variables to represent the trading volume of each stock. These are 
important regressors as a proxy for differences of opinion in the analysis to be 
conducted in the following sections.  
      is defined as the ratio of the average monthly trading volume to 
the number of shares outstanding for firm .  is derived by subtracting 
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where itradeτ  is the number of shares traded of stock  on the i thτ  day, itotal τ  is 
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3For small firms, there sometimes are no trades. This survivorship bias is inevitable in obtaining 
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It is possible for  to be biased because of specific characteristics of 
a firm’s share owner structure, so, alternatively, we define  to capture the 
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In the theoretical model of Hong and Stein (2003), the trading variables are expected to 
capture the size of differences of opinions.  
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That is, itRET  represents the sequence of daily returns, which is the de-meaned excess 
return relative to the TOPIX for stock , in either six-month or three-month period .  i t
 
 




All the data on stock prices and trading volume are from the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(TSE) daily data summary. Unless otherwise specified, samples are non-financial 
corporations listed on either the TSE’s first or second section. The data period is April 1, 
1980 to March 31, 2002. This is 5,736 trading days. The total number of available listed 
firms is 1,741.  
In our regression with firm-level data, we use non-overlapping observations of 
either six-months or three-months. A maximum of five missing daily observations is 
allowed. The sub periods start in April or October, but this does not affect the results in 
general.4 However, the choice of a time horizon for measuring skewness may affect the 
regression results and this point will be discussed in Section 5.2.  
Earlier research on US markets found that firm size affects the return distribution. 
Thus, we define the variable  for firm i  in period t  as a log of the value 
of the total market capitalization of the firm measured in million yen.
itLOGSIZE
5 Return data are 
disaggregated by firm size. The available data are sorted according to firms’ current 
total capitalization in each period. This listing is divided into quintiles with group 5 
containing the largest stocks.  
 
 
                                                 
4In Section 5.3, a three-month sub-period starting in March is used because of the timing of the 
regulatory change occurred in February 2002. 
5The total market capitalization of each firm is based on the end-day of each accounting period. Data 
are from Toyokeizai Data Disk 2001. 
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3.2 Characteristics of Firm-level Return Data 
 
A variety of summary statistics for our sample are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The 
means and standard deviations of all of our variables for the full sample of individual 
firms, five size-based sub samples, and the market as a whole, represented by TOPIX 
defined as the value-weighted index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, are shown for two 
periods: 1980-89 and 1990-2001. Contemporaneous correlation and autocorrelation 
among these variables are calculated and summarized in the Appendix Table.  
     The period of the asset price bubbles in the late 1980s deserves special attention. 
For this reason, we divided the sample period into two segments; the period including 
the peak of the bubble, which was the end of 1989, and the period after the bubble.  
     In Tables 1 and 2, positive skewness is observed for any size individual firm and 
the mean value of  for all firms is SKEW 0 484.  for 1980 to 1989, and  for 
1990 to 2001. In general, smaller firms (first quintile) exhibit a more positively skewed 
return distribution. In other words, larger firms show relatively symmetric return 
distributions and are described better as normal distributions. This observation applies 
to the data in both data periods. Returns were more skewed in the 1980s than in 1990 to 
2001. This may be related to the behavior of the market index, which showed a sharp 
rise in the late 1980s. Indeed, the 
0 249.
RET  was generally much higher in the 1980s.  
     Asymmetries measured by  are confirmed by calculated values of SKEW
DUVOL . Smaller firms and data in the 1980s show higher values of DUVOL , being 
associated with positively skewed distribution of returns.6  
     These asymmetries are closely associated with higher values of DOUT , rather 
than higher values of , implying that outliers matter in the creation of a skewed 
distributions. By any statistics calculated in this paper, asymmetries of the return 
distribution are more evident for smaller firms. For the US data, CHS (2001) have 
reported more positively skewed distributions for small-cap firms as well, which 
suggest that this asymmetry may be caused by more arbitrary disclosure of good 
information on their own firms. Regarding the information structure, it might be true 
that managers of smaller firms have more scope for managerial discretion in disclosure, 
implying that bad news may not be released immediately. This hypothesis could be 
applied to Japanese case as well. However, disclosure rules are not a function of firm 
size, so smaller firms are as obligated as larger ones to disclosure. Given the trend 
toward stricter application of these rules, there remain questions about this explanation 
even for the 1990s.  
DMA
     Smaller firms seem to be more volatile than larger ones.  is larger for 
smaller firms and this is true for both sub-periods. Stock volatility, particularly when 
measured in TOPIX, looks slightly higher in the 1990s and later.  
itSIGMA
      
 
                                                 
iRτ
6Under the hypothesis that daily return  in period  follows an identical normal distribution 
independently,  follows 
t
2
24 ( 2)( 3)





N − −+ + +,itSKEW . When we test the samples with this 
hypothesis, 5,236 samples among 8,067 for 1980 to 1989 data and 7,799 among 17,670 are rejected 
against the null hypothesis at a 5 percent significance level. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (1980-1989): six-month period 
 
 size1  size2 size3 size4 size5 All firms TOPIX  
tSKEW  Mean 0.625  0.533 0.459 0.369 0.429  0.484 -0.155  
    S.D. 0.617  0.675 0.752 0.960 0.870  0.789 0.845  
tDUVOL  Mean 0.453  0.407 0.374 0.327 0.349  0.382 -0.083  
     S.D. 0.320  0.340 0.359 0.410 0.389  0.368 0.409  
tDMA  Mean 0.002  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001  0.000  
    S.D. 0.002  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001  0.002  0.001  
tDOUT  Mean 0.008  0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005  0.006 -0.001  
    S.D. 0.008  0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008  0.008 0.010  
tSIGMA  Mean 0.025  0.023 0.022 0.020 0.018  0.022 0.007  
    S.D. 0.007  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005  0.006 0.004  
tLOGSIZE  Mean 10.189  11.001 11.629 12.317 13.519 11.718  -  
           S.D. 0.469  0.295 0.320 0.348 0.706  1.239 -  
tTOVER  Mean 0.093  0.088 0.084 0.075 0.034  0.076 -   
     S.D. 0.129  0.078 0.083 0.079 0.121  0.134  -  
tDTOVER  Mean 0.004  0.005 0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001  -  
          S.D. 0.053  0.056 0.057 0.055 0.056  0.092  -  
tTRADE  Mean 250,632  433,173 655,468 1,035,078 2,813,257 1,034,030 -  
     S.D. 294,150  494,900 847,531 1,906,058 6,702,776 3,276,321 -  
tDTRADE  Mean -0.163  -0.144 -0.194 -0.185 -0.177 -0.173 -   
          S.D. 0.620  0.606 0.668 0.642 0.558  0.621 -  
tRET  Mean 0.041  0.022 0.012 -0.012 -0.039 0.005 0.080  
   S.D. 0.237  0.232 0.237 0.225 0.209  0.230 0.109  
No.of obs. 1,607  1,607 1,607 1,607 1,607  8,067 20   
 
NOTE: The sample period is April 1980 to March 1990.  is the coefficient of skewness, 
measured using market-adjusted daily returns in the six-month period .  is the log of 
the ratio of up-day to down-day standard deviation, measured using market-adjusted returns in the 
six-month period.  is the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns measured in 
the six-month period .  is the log of the market capitalization measured at the end of 
period .  (shown as T ) is an average monthly turnover measured in the 






t DTURNOVER  is detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior 18 
months.  is average daily trading volume in the six-month period ,detrended by a 
moving average of trading volume in the prior 18 months, and standardized by the value of own 
current volume. 
DTRADE t
itRET  is the market-adjusted cumulative return in the six-month period . Size 
quintiles are based on market capitalization.   
t
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Table 2. Summary Statistics (1990-2002): six-month period 
 size1  size2  size3  size4  size5  All firms TOPIX  
tSKEW  Mean 0.443  0.347 0.232  0.146  0.075  0.249  0.197  
S.D. 0.771  0.767 0.716  0.727  0.690  0.747  0.546  
tDUVOL Mean 0.271  0.217 0.153  0.117  0.071  0.166 0.149  
S.D. 0.410  0.397 0.378  0.372  0.355  0.390  0.288  
  Mean tDMA 0.001  0.001 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  
S.D. 0.002  0.002 0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.001  
tDOUT Mean 0.005  0.004 0.003  0.002  0.001  0.003 0.003  
S.D. 0.009  0.009 0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009 0.008  
tSIGMA Mean 0.031  0.026 0.024  0.022  0.020  0.025 0.013  
S.D. 0.014  0.010 0.009  0.009  0.009  0.011 0.003  
tLOGSIZE Mean 9.675  10.478 11.127 11.897 13.378  11.305 -   
S.D. 0.673  0.536 0.483  0.406  0.782  1.403 -   
tTOVER  Mean 0.044  0.036 0.034  0.034  0.025  0.035 -   
S.D. 0.070  0.049 0.042  0.033  0.048  0.051  -   
tDTOVER  Mean 0.002  0.000 -0.001 0.000  0.000  0.000 -   
S.D. 0.049  0.032 0.027  0.019  0.016  0.031  -  
  MeantTRADE  127,279 173,458 242,428 389,492 1,129,170 411,878 -   
S.D.264,345 302,821 398,602 600,033 1,528,016 859,063 -   
  Mean tDTRADE -0.234 -0.177 -0.138 -0.075 0.001  -0.125 -   
S.D. 0.716  0.553 0.476  0.378  0.248  0.507  -   
   tRET    Mean -0.051 -0.041 -0.037 -0.020 -0.001  -0.030 -0.028  
S.D. 0.278  0.240 0.233  0.234  0.215  0.242 0.150  
No.of obs. 3,526  3,526 3,526  3,526  3,526  17,670 24   
 




The trading activities measured by  is high in the 1980s compared 
with the latter half of our sample period. For both sub-periods, larger firms were traded 
less actively when judged by measure of the turnover ratio, although s were 
obviously greater for firms in the largest-capitalization quintile than smaller ones. 
Trading activity was generally more active in the 1980s than in the 1990s and later.  
TURNOVER
TRADE
In up trends of the market in the 1980s, smaller firms recorded higher rates of 
return than average. However, overall observations suggest that larger firms, those in 
quintiles 4 and 5, have performed better than those in 2 and 3. Size 1 firms seem to 
show exceptional behavior especially in the 1980s. Negative numbers of RET  in the 
1990s seem to coincide with the bursting of the bubbles. 
     The non-overlapping time series of  and  for all firms are 
plotted in Figure 1 together with TOPIX. First, we confirm how the market index rose 
so sharply towards the end of the 1980s in what is described as a bubble. Second, the 
measure of the skewness of individual firm returns has stayed positive for all the data 
tSKEW tDUVOL
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period, although some fluctuations in values are observed. Third,  and 
 show almost the same pattern. Thus, for regression analysis, we only use 
















































































































     
From the panels in the Appendix, some hints are obtained regarding the 
relationships among variables. Panel A of the Appendix Table shows the 
contemporaneous correlation between any pair of the variables and Panel B shows the 
lagged correlation among the variables. It is worth noting that  has a strong 
positive correlation with 
SKEW
DUVOL , whose correlation coefficient is  . This 
suggests that these two variables represent very similar pieces of information despite 
their totally different means of derivation. On the other hand, their correlations with 
 are relatively weak, as 
0 874.
SIGMA 0 092.  and 0 159. , respectively. Thus, to predict the 
variables to measure the skewness of the return distribution is not necessarily to provide 
any information about the variance.  
Autocorrelation is rather small: 0.136 for  and 0SKEW 190.  for DUVOL . For 
, it is , suggesting that that  and SIGMA 0 611. SKEW DUVOL  are not persistent 
although  appears relatively persistent. The correlation between SIGMA tRET  and 
 is . Between tSIGMA 0 099− . tRET  and 1tSIGMA +  it is 0 202− . . This implies that a 
decrease in stock return tends to slightly increase volatility contemporaneously and in 
the following period.  
 
3.3 Market Returns: TOPIX 
 
Most previous researchers report that market returns are negatively skewed, while our 
statistics for individual stocks have shown a positive skewness. These statistics imply 
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that sharp rises may tend to occur more frequently at the firm level than in the market 
index.  
     Daily TOPIX data are sub-grouped into six-month periods with the corresponding 
returns defined as log changes. The last column of Tables 1 and 2 presents the sample 
mean and standard deviation of the relevant values of TOPIX for each six-month 
period.  
     Note that the volatility of daily market returns has increased since the late 1980s. 
This is confirmed by the values of  shown in Tables 1 and 2 as  in the 
1980s, and  in the 1990s. The 1990s data distribution looks rather positively 
skewed. This differs from results obtained in the US markets. The difference may relate 
to the 1989 bursting of the Japanese market bubble.  
SIGMA 0 007.
0 013.
     Concerning the negative skewness of the market return in contrast with the 
positive skewness in returns of individual stocks, CHS (2001) suggest the possibility it 
can be interpreted as indicating that the difference in investor opinions is greater for the 
market as a whole than for individual stocks. Taking this interpretation and applying it 
to time-series observations in Japan, we come to the conclusion that the differences in 
investor opinions have decreased since the 1989 bursting of the bubble: however, the 
differences in opinion intuitively seem rather to be more diversified, people having 
more variety of views and opinions on the economic outlook and other relevant 
variables.  
     Engle and Ng (1993) analyzed the daily returns of TOPIX from 1980 to 1988 and 
reported that innovation in the rate of return explained negative third moment and flat 
fourth moment at a high level with no dummy variables for a day of the week and no 
auto-correlated variables. They analyzed how it is possible to predict the fluctuations of 
volatility caused by various shocks, in comparison with models like EGARCH as 
presented in Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993), and confirmed that negative 
shocks tend to have larger volatility than positive shocks for all of these models. They 
reported that this tendency is especially remarkable when the shocks are large. Though 
their analysis does not cover the 1990s, their point of negative shocks accompanied by 
greater volatility may apply to the TOPIX data in the 1990s. In addition, 
macroeconomic variables including industrial production and debt ratios of the 
corporate sector may explain a rise in volatility in the 1990s in Japan since it is reported 
that stock market volatility has been found to increase with financial leverage and 
during recession in the US market (Schwert (1989)).  
 
 
4  Firm-Level Regression Analysis 
 
4.1 Background of the Empirical Analysis 
 
In the theoretical model described in Hong and Stein (2003), the large differences in 
investor opinions about the intrinsic value of individual stocks may cause the negative 
skewness in return distributions under the institutional friction of short-sale constraints.7 
                                                 
7In their model, differential information structure among players and overconfidence in certain types 
of players are also assumed. The model where overconfidence affects trading volume and market 
depth is discussed, for example, in Odean (1998). 
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Chen, Hong and Stein (2001) have shown one way to verify this hypothesis by 
regression analysis using data on returns and trading volume for all NYSE and AMEX 
firms.  
     In the Hong-Stein model, large differences in investor opinions are associated 
with a larger amount of trading. However, if the more-bearish investors face 
short-selling constraints, part of their sales demand is hidden in the current period and 
their hidden demand is revealed in the following period. This causes a sharp drop in 
price and makes the skewness of the rate of return distribution negative in the 
subsequent period.  
     The Hong-Stein model is consistent with the view that the efficiency of the 
market is assured by the assumption of there being rational and risk-neutral arbitragers 
while investors facing constraints on short-selling are present. Further, the relation 
between the third moment of the rate of return and trading volume can be analyzed 
without any constraint on the sign of skewness in the rate of return.  
Based on this hypothesis, CHS (2001) reported that negative skewness occurs 
most often in two cases. First, the trading volume in the previous six-month period is 
large compared to the preceding trend, and, second, the rate of return in the preceding 
36 months is positive (that is, stocks are in some situation like a bubble).  
     In this section, we conduct a similar regression analysis to identify the variables 
to determine the features of the return distribution using firm-level data. The purpose is 
to show whether any variables have forecasting power regarding the third moment in 
the return distribution in the following period. The variables used for regressions are as 
defined in section 2 and individual stock data are from April 1980 to March 2002. For 
the analysis, the following model is assumed:  
 1 0 1 2 3
4 8 4 1
it it it it
it it it
SKEW SIGMA DTURNOVER LOGSIZE
RET RET




= + + +
+ + + +L  
where itε  is an error term. To consider possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations 
in error terms, adjusted t-values are calculated.8  can be replaced by 




4.2 Pooled Regression: Cross-section of all firms 
 
First, we regressed  against , ,  and 
preceding cumulative returns of firm  to examine how the conditional third moment 
of the rate of return at  is accounted for with information until time . In addition 
to the regressors described so far, we also include six-month period dummy variables to 
control period-specific macroeconomic conditions and the variable  as 
explanatory variables.  




     Table 3 presents the results of the pooled cross-section regression of all firms. 
The regression period is divided into the first 10 years, which is before the bubble burst, 
and the subsequent 12 years. In both periods, all the coefficients except some lagged 
variables of cumulative returns are estimated with statistical significance at the 5 
percent level.  
                                                 
8Based on these adjusted t-values, adjusted p-values are reported in the following tables. 
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          Table 3.  Pooled Regression ( All firms: six-month period) 
 
 1980-89 1990-01 1980-01 1980-89 1990-01 1980-01  
tSKEW  0.069 0.098 0.087 0.069 0.100 0.087  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
tSIGMA   4.561  8.152  7.957  4.303  7.709  7.746   
 (0.045)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000)  (0.000)  
tDTURNOVER  -0.150  -0.782 -0.439 -  -  -   
 (0.450)  (0.001) (0.002) -  -  -   
tDTRADE   - -  -  -0.002 -0.035  -0.028   
 -  -  - (0.939) (0.009)  (0.007)  
tRET   -0.253  -0.265 -0.309 -0.269 -0.277  -0.314   
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
1tRET −   -0.046  -0.074 -0.104 -0.044 -0.08  -0.103   
 (0.338)  (0.014) (0.000) (0.351) (0.008)  (0.000)  
2tRET −   -0.103  -0.126 -0.15  -0.095 -0.127  -0.153   
 (0.028)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000)  (0.000)  
3tRET −   -0.067  -0.11  -0.105 -0.063 -0.110  -0.106   
 (0.170)  (0.002) (0.000) (0.203) (0.002)  (0.000)  
4tRET −   -0.058  -0.058 -0.086 -0.055 -0.059  -0.085   
 (0.277)  (0.082) (0.001) (0.290) (0.078)  (0.001)  
tLOGSIZE   -0.049  -0.054 -0.046 -0.05  -0.052  -0.045   
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
No. of obs. 6,236  15,167 24,316 6,236  15,167  24,316  
Adjusted 2R   0.030  0.110  0.104  0.030  0.110  0.104   
 
NOTE: The total sample period is April 1980 to March 2002. The dependent variable is 1i tSKEW , + , 
the coefficient of skewness, measured using market-adjusted daily returns in the six-month period 
.  is the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns measured in the 




t DTURNOVER  is average monthly turnover in the six-month period , detrended by a 
moving average of turnover in the prior 18 months.  is average daily trading volume in 
the six-month period , detrended by a moving average of trading volume in the prior 18 months, 




4it i tRET RET , −L  is the market-adjusted 
cumulative return in the six-month period  through t 4t − . All regressions contain dummies for 
each time period (not shown); p-values, which are in parenthesis, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 




Current skewness, volatility and own cumulative return have explanatory power 
for the size of skewness in the following period: the greater the size of skewness and 
volatility, the greater the size of the skewness in the next six-month period of firm-level 
returns. This is true for both sub-periods as well as the whole period. The positive 
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coefficients of  and  indicate that the rate of return after high 
volatility and skewness tends to show larger positive skewness.  
itSIGMA itSKEW
When trading volume is high relative to the previous trend, we observe a more 
negatively skewed distribution of daily returns in the next six-month period if the model 
is fitted to 1990 to 2001 data. The coefficients of DTURNOVER  are 
,  and 0 150(1980 89)− . − 0 782(1990 2001)− . − 0 439(1980 2001)− . − , of which the 
coefficient for 1980 to 89 is statistically insignificant. This suggests that in periods after 
larger-than-trend trading volumes 1i tSKEW , +  tends to be smaller, implying that the 
distribution in rate of return of period 1t +  is skewed more to the left. Similar results 
are confirmed when we regress with the variable . The estimated coefficients 
are , , and 
DTRADE
0 002(1980 89)− . − 0 035(1990 2001)− . − 0 028(1980 2001)− . − . Again, the 
coefficient for 1980 to 1989 turns out to be statistically insignificant.  
 The result that all the coefficients of previous (accumulated rate of) returns are 
negative and statistically significant indicates that stocks whose prices have been rising 
tend to have smaller s. This means the rates of return tend to be more negatively 
skewed. Total market capitalization is a factor in explaining the negative skewness in 
the following period. Estimated values are 
SKEW
0 049(1980 89)− . − , 0 054(1990 2001)− . − , 
and  in the specification with 0 046(1980 2001)− . − DTURNOVER .  
It is noted that the statistical significance of these coefficients is strongly 
confirmed when the model is applied to the period 1990 to 2001 for both specifications. 
Also, the sizes of the coefficients are larger in the period after the bubble. Because the 
bubble period is more definitively characterized in its up trends than in its crash phase, 
it is not surprising that the model would not be fitted to these extraordinary situations. 
Thus, we will focus on the data for 1990 to 2001 that is the period after the crash of the 
bubble hereafter.  
Another reason to focus on the data from 1990 to 2001 is related to the 
institutional framework. In Japanese capital markets, many deregulatory measures were 
taken in the 1990s. Among others, the full deregulation of brokerage fees in 1999 might 
have some impact on trading behavior.9 In later part of this paper, we examine more 
recent data and ask how empirical results are affected.  
 
4.3 Cuts on Market Capitalization 
 
Next, we conduct regression analysis according to market-capitalization quintile. 
Comparing the features of each group, the larger stocks tend to have smaller skewness 
in their returns (the absolute value of  is smaller), as shown in Tables 1 and 2.  SKEW
Regression results are shown in panels A and B of Table 4. From the panels, we 
first confirm the stability of the estimated coefficients for  and  with 
positive sign. The explanatory power of past cumulative returns is, in general, negative 
in sign and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level for all the cases for up to 
one-period lag. However, the effects of longer lags are mixed. Lags of three periods or 




                                                 
9Theoretical models typically assume that transaction costs are zero. 
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Table 4. Pooled regression: Cuts by firm size (1990-2001)  
PANEL A size1  size2  size3 size4  size5   
tSKEW   0.064  0.125  0.082 0.074  0.088   
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
tSIGMA   8.464  11.927 12.255 4.882  5.810   
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.007)   
tDTURNOVER   -1.103  -1.184 -0.712 -0.387 0.802   
 (0.000)  (0.009) (0.199) (0.663) (0.202)   
tRET   -0.194  -0.346 -0.291 -0.239 -0.385   
 (0.013)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)   
1tRET −   -0.074  -0.047 -0.006 -0.120 0.009   
 (0.283)  (0.518) (0.914) (0.044) (0.867)   
2tRET −   -0.175  -0.195 -0.034 -0.153 -0.101   
 (0.007)  (0.006) (0.624) (0.027) (0.162)   
No. of obs.  3581  3581  3581 3581  3581   
Adjusted 2R   0.132  0.135  0.080 0.064  0.054   
PANEL B size1 size2 size3 size4 size5 
tSKEW   0.072  0.128  0.083 0.075  0.087   
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
tSIGMA   7.672  11.258 11.282 5.566  6.776   
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.002)   
tDTRADE   -0.065  -0.041 0.006 -0.075 -0.098   
 (0.001)  (0.078) (0.836) (0.063) (0.061)   
tRET   -0.225  -0.383 -0.329 -0.215 -0.342   
 (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)   
1tRET −   -0.078  -0.072 -0.019 -0.118 0.018   
 (0.257)  (0.319) (0.747) (0.046) (0.738)   
2tRET −   -0.183  -0.187 -0.019 -0.172 -0.131   
 (0.005)  (0.010) (0.789) (0.011) (0.075)   
No. of obs.  3,581  3,581  3,581 3,581  3,581   
Adjusted 2R   0.131  0.133  0.079 0.065  0.055   
NOTE: The total sample period is April 1990 to March 2002. The dependent variable is 1i tSKEW , + , 
the coefficient of skewness, measured using market-adjusted daily returns in the six-month period 
.  is the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns measured in the 
six-month period . 
1t + itSIGMA
t DTURNOVER  is average monthly turnover in the six-month period , 
detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior 18 months.  is average daily 
trading volume in the six-month period , detrended by a moving average of trading volume in the 




1it i tRET RET , −,  and 
2i tRET , −  are the market-adjusted cumulative return in the six-month period t  through . 
Capitalization groups are quintiles, with group 5 the largest. All regressions contain dummies for 
each time period (not shown); p-values, which are in parenthesis, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 




Negative coefficients are estimated for DTURNOVER  for two smaller 
capitalization groups that are significant, but coefficients are not significant for 
large-cap groups. The variable  turns out to be statistically significant with 
negative sign except for group 3. As an overall evaluation, the proposed model appears 
to be better fitted to smaller-cap groups by using either trading variable. Since CHS 
(2001) report that the coefficients on 
itDTRADE
DTURNOVER  are robust for large firms, the 
results with Japanese data are in contrast in this respect. This point will be discussed in 
the next subsection.  
 
4.4 Why Do Smaller-Cap Firms Better Fit the Model? 
 
In the theoretical model of Hong and Stein (2003), skewness in stock returns is due to 
institutional frictions and differences of opinions. The previous subsection shows that 
small-cap firms appear to be better-explained by the model than larger-cap firms. Let us 
consider why. Differential trading regulations is not a reason because the same rules 
apply regardless of market capitalization.  
 Holding structure is a possible explanation. Data are in Table 5. First, the 
percentage of shares held by mutual fund increases as market-cap becomes larger. 
Because larger-cap firms show less-skewed distributions, mutual fund holdings are not 
a major factor in skewness in Tokyo markets. Second, the percentage of shares held by 
non-residents and financial institutions becomes higher as capitalization size increases. 
Investors such as non-residents and financial institutions may include hedge funds and 
other institutional investors, and it is presumed that large-cap stocks are subject to 
highly active trading.  
 On the other hand, for small-cap stocks, the percentage of shares held by 
non-financial corporations and the largest shareholders, which often includes the 
founders of a firm and is defined as the 10 largest holders, is high. Their trading may be 
rather infrequent. Small shareholders hold a relatively large share of small-cap stocks.10 
A high percentage of shares being in the hands of non-financial corporations, largest 
shareowners, and smaller shareholders all imply less liquidity. Under such conditions, 
the trading impact may be relatively larger in small-caps than larger-cap stocks. And, if 
more conservative investors are involved in small stocks, an asymmetric pattern with 
positive skewness may arise because of their investment style.  
 When the share ownership structure described above is considered, we prefer the 
variable  to DTRADE DTURNOVER  as a de-trended trading proxies. Based on the 
regression results of the specification with , our tentative conjecture is that 
small-cap firms involve more conservative investors with relatively high trading costs, 
and thus the demand from bearish investors is more inclined to be hidden to create a 
negative relationship between conditional skewness and past turnover despite the 
positivity of observed skewness, given Hong and Stein (2003) as an underlying 





                                                 
10Small holders are those owning fewer than 50 trading units. The usual trading unit is 1,000 shares. 
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Table 5. Holding Structure of Shares by Firm Size (shown in percentage) 
 












size1  37.0 1.3 19.6 50.0 - -  
 34.5  1.4  14.9  52.3  0.4  33.7   
size2  34.5 2.3 26.0 47.1 - -  
 31.9  2.9  19.0  49.1  1.3  29.5   
size3 28.9 3.5 31.2 41.4 - -  
 29.5  4.5  27.3  48.9  3.2  26.0   
size4 23.7 6.9 40.0 40.5 - -  
 28.0  7.1  25.5  48.4  5.1  19.9   
size5  14.8 12.7 49.0 33.2 - -  
 19.9  15.2  46.3  41.6  4.6  15.7   
 
NOTE:  
1. Numbers in the first row in each cell show 1999 figures and those in the second 
show 2002 figures. Data are from the Nikkei NEEDS Database for 1999 and Spring 2003 
issue of Nikkei Corporate Data Quarterly (Nikkei Kaisha Jouhou) for 2002. These figures 
are shown as percentage of total numbers of shares issued. Because data are available only 
discontinuously, the table provides just a snap-shot.  
2. Firms are listed non-financial corporations on the first and second sections of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. Exact date of data compilation may differ by firms according to 
their accounting period between March 2002 and February 2002.   
3. Since the dataset used for regressions are sorted by the number of observed entries, 
the sample universe of this Table is not equal to them. The total number of firms used to 
construct this table is 1,501 for 1999 and 1,928 for 2002. Thus, each quintile is 300 firms 
for 1999 and 385 for 2002, with the middle quintiles being rounded up.  
4. "Holdings by corporations" means the shares held by non-financial corporations 
and those "by 10 largest holders" refers to the shares held by the top-10 share owners and 
other special interest groups. "Mutual fund holdings" is included in the shares held by 
financial institutions in general. "Small-share holders" refer to those owning fewer than 50 
minimum trading units of shares. For most firms, the minimum trading unit is 1,000 shares. 
Since the categorization is not mutually exclusive, total does not add up to 100 percent.  
 
 
5 Tests for Robustness and a Change in Short-selling Regulations 
 
5.1 Tests with Outliers Truncated 
 
To test the robustness of the results presented in the previous section, we conducted 
further examinations. Because the skewness may be closely related to the values of 
some outlying samples, robustness tests are conducted by truncating these outliers. 
Following the method employed in CHS (2001), return data exceeding the value of 
three times the sample  in each period  were omitted in constructing a new 
series of  as the ’outliers truncated dataset’. The regression results using this 





1989, 1990 to 2001, and 1980 through 2001.  
     When Table 6 is compared with Table 3, almost nothing about our previous 
conclusions changes with respect to the variables , , and past 
cumulative returns, although slight changes in the size of some estimated coefficients 
are observed. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients of 
itSKEW itSIGMA
DTURNOVER  have to 
be carefully examined: in most cases, we observe negative signs, although their 
statistical significance is in question even for the period 1990-2001.  
      
Table 6. Pooled regression (Outliers truncated: six-month period ) 
 1980-89  1990-01 1980-01 1980-89 1990-01  1980-01  
tSKEW   0.093  0.079 0.082 0.094  0.079  0.082   
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
tSIGMA   5.227  4.266 4.511 5.335  4.292  4.538   
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
tDTURNOVER  -0.026  -0.002 -0.012 -  -  -   
 (0.692)  (0.985) (0.820) -  -  -   
tDTRADE   -  -  -  -0.012  -0.002  -0.003   
 -  -  -  (0.061) (0.679)  (0.399)  
tRET   -0.060  -0.076 -0.080 -0.049  -0.075  -0.079   
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)  (0.000)  
1tRET −   -0.052  -0.051 -0.055 -0.050  -0.050  -0.054   
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000)  
2tRET −   -0.051  -0.036 -0.038 -0.058  -0.037  -0.040   
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000)  
3tRET −   -0.020  -0.006 -0.006 -0.023  -0.006  -0.007   
 (0.233)  (0.630) (0.480) (0.163) (0.613)  (0.445)  
4tRET −   -0.032  -0.010 -0.024 -0.032  -0.010  -0.024   
 (0.046)  (0.414) (0.008) (0.042) (0.411)  (0.008)  
tLOGSIZE   -0.005  -0.012 -0.009 -0.005  -0.012  -0.009   
 (0.112)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000)  (0.000)  
No. of obs.  6,236  15,167 24,316 6,236  15,167  24,316   
Adjusted 2R  0.040  0.101 0.144 0.040  0.101  0.144   
 
NOTE: The total sample period is April 1980 to March 2002. The dependent variable is 1i tSKEW , + , 
the coefficient of skewness, measured using the market-adjusted daily returns in the six-month 
period .  is the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns measured in the 
six-month period . 
1t + itSIGMA
t DTURNOVER  is average monthly turnover in the six-month period , 
detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior 18 months.  is average daily 
trading volume in the six-month period , detrended by a moving average of trading volume in the 




4it i tRET RET , −L  is the 
market-adjusted cumulative return in the six-month period t  through 4t − . All regressions 
contain dummies for each time period (not shown); p-values, which are in parenthesis, are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and correlation.    
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In the usual case of testing robustness by truncating outliers, a better fit of the 
model is expected. Here, however, we have less explanatory power. Is this bad news? 
We think it is not, as we are concerned about outliers creating skewness in the return 
distribution. Thus, it is quite natural when we end up with a worse fitting. We should 
note the important role of the outlying sample in constructing the theoretical model.  
 
5.2 The Choice of a Time Horizon for Measuring Skewness 
 
A six-month horizon is not inherent in the theory. Rather, it is a matter of empirical tests. 
Thus, we test a three-month period. For this, we focus on data in the 1990s and later 
because bubble-period data appear to be less appropriate. (The model studied here is not 
derived to explain bubbles.) Summary statistics are in Table 7.  
 
     Table 7. Summary Statistics: three-month period (1990.4 to 2002.3) 
 
 size1 size2 size3 size4 size5 All firms   
tSKEW Mean 0.349 0.273 0.207 0.140 0.085 0.211   
       S.D. 0.772 0.757 0.746 0.716 0.638 0.734   
tDUVOL Mean 0.232 0.185 0.146 0.108 0.071 0.149   
         S.D. 0.514 0.493 0.483 0.464 0.435 0.482   
tDMA Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
      S.D. 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003   
tDOUT Mean 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003   
        S.D. 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012   
tSIGMA Mean 0.031 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.025   
        S.D. 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.012   
tDTURNOVER Mean 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000   
              S.D. 0.052 0.037 0.030 0.023 0.016 0.034   
tDTRADE Mean -0.285 -0.225 -0.161 -0.113 -0.049 -0.167   
          S.D. 0.756 0.596 0.491 0.424 0.301 0.544   
tRET Mean -0.024 -0.022 -0.017 -0.012 -0.001 -0.015   
     S.D. 0.223 0.188 0.177 0.171 0.156 0.185   
No.of obs. 8,781 8,781 8,781 8,781 8,781 44,000   
 
NOTE: The total sample period is April 1990 to March 2002. The same notes apply as Tables 3 and 




Skewness of the distribution is positive in all categories of firm groups and larger 
in smaller-cap firms. The distributions are more asymmetrical in smaller-cap firms in 
terms of the measures in DUVOL  and DOUT  as well, and size 1 and 2 firms show 
larger volatility. The larger-cap firms in size 5 show better performance on average than 
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smaller-cap ones, as seen in the higher value in itRET . These characteristics are 
basically the same as for the dataset for a six-month periods in Table 2.  
Regression results are slightly sensitive to the choice of the length of sub-period. 
The results are shown in Table 8. In this case we have more stable results with respect 
to the variables  and  at the one percent significance level. 
This implies relatively higher trading activities from the trend in the current period lead 
to a smaller value of  of the return distribution in the following period. Even 
with outliers truncated, we obtained negative coefficients and statistical significance for 






Table 8. Pooled Regression (All firms: three-month period) 1990.4 to 2002.3  
 full sample Outliers 
truncated 
full sample Outliers 
truncated  
tSKEW   0.057  0.050  0.058  0.051   
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
tSIGMA   7.025  4.504  6.978  4.468   
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
tDTURNOVER  -0.413  -0.127  -  -   
 (0.001)  (0.084)    
tDTRADE   -  -  -0.040  -0.011   
   (0.000)  (0.007)   
tRET   -0.214  -0.105  -0.209  -0.105   
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
1tRET −   -0.166  -0.061  -0.171  -0.062   
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
2tRET −   -0.054  -0.007  -0.067  -0.010   
 (0.027)  (0.574)  (0.007)  (0.448)   
3tRET −   0.002  -0.015  -0.004  -0.016   
 (0.934)  (0.232)  (0.867)  (0.209)   
4tRET −   -0.108  -0.042  -0.110  -0.042   
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)   
tLOGSIZE   -0.041  -0.010  -0.038  -0.010   
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
No. of obs.  39,754  39,754  39,754  39,754   
Adjusted 2R   0.100  0.072  0.101  0.072   
 
NOTE: The total sample period is April 1990 to March 2002. The dependent variable is 1i tSKEW , + , 
the coefficient of skewness, measured using market-adjusted daily returns in the six-month period 
.  is the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns measured in the 
six-month period . 
1t + itSIGMA
t DTURNOVER  is average monthly turnover in the six-month period , 




trading volume in the six-month period , detrended by a moving average of trading volume in the 
prior 18 months, and standardized by the value of own current volume. 
t
4it i tRET RET , −L  is the 
market-adjusted cumulative return in the six-month period t  through 4t − . All regressions 
contain dummies for each time period (not shown); p-values, which are in parenthesis, are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and correlation.   
 
 
Similar investigations are also conducted on the data set cut by capitalization, 
reported in Table 9. Our previous conclusions are more evidently confirmed. The 
coefficients for  are estimated as negative except for size 5, and those 
of  are again all negative in signs and are significant at the one percent level, 




Table 9. Cut by Firm-size: three-month period (1990 – 2002) 
PANEL A    PANEL B     
 size1 size2  size3 size4 size5 size1 size2 size3  size4  size5  
tSKEW   0.040  0.067 0.062 0.039 0.037 0.045 0.068 0.062  0.040 0.037  
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
tSIGMA   6.106  7.276 9.503 7.687 5.615 5.787 7.312 9.532  7.505 6.215  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
tDTURNOVER  -0.520  -0.501 -0.606 -0.452 0.142 -  -  -  -  -  
 (0.003) (0.121) (0.077) (0.232) (0.763) -  -  -  -  -  
itDTRADE   -  -  -  -  -  -0.039 -0.054 -0.057  -0.020 -0.068 
 -  -  -  -  -  (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.285) (0.004)
tRET   -0.246  -0.199 -0.239 -0.212 -0.277 -0.266 -0.182 -0.232  -0.223 -0.248 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1tRET −   -0.042  -0.209 -0.106 -0.242 -0.242 -0.056 -0.216 -0.112  -0.246 -0.237 
 (0.480) (0.002) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.343) (0.001) (0.088) (0.000) (0.000) 
2tRET −   -0.032  -0.136 0.018 -0.070 -0.089 -0.047 -0.161 0.004  -0.067 -0.109 
 (0.591) (0.041) (0.756) (0.223) (0.083) (0.430) (0.017) (0.948) (0.243) (0.035) 
3tRET −   0.092  -0.003 -0.110 0.013 -0.077 0.081 -0.012 -0.114  0.013 -0.092 
 (0.110) (0.969) (0.050) (0.824) (0.144) (0.165) (0.858) (0.042) (0.821) (0.083) 
4tRET −   -0.099  -0.122 -0.052 -0.171 -0.155 -0.099 -0.124 -0.055  -0.170 -0.161 
 (0.106) (0.052) (0.370) (0.001) (0.001) (0.109) (0.048) (0.342) (0.001) (0.001) 
tLOGSIZE   -0.023  -0.123 -0.024 -0.044 -0.002 -0.023 -0.116 -0.017  -0.041 0.001  
 (0.350) (0.003) (0.465) (0.094) (0.863) (0.356) (0.006) (0.612) (0.123) (0.939) 
No. of obs  7,933  7,933 7,933 7,933 7,933 7,933 7,933 7,933  7,933 7,933  
Adjusted 2R   0.131  0.130 0.089 0.069 0.059 0.131 0.131 0.089  0.069 0.060  
 
NOTE: The total sample period is April 1990 to March 2002. The dependent variable is 1i tSKEW , + , 
the coefficient of skewness, measured using market-adjusted daily returns in the six-month period 
.  is the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns measured in the 
six-month period . 
1t + itSIGMA
t DTURNOVER  is average monthly turnover in the six-month period , t
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detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior 18 months.  is average daily 
trading volume in the six-month period , detrended by a moving average of trading volume in the 
prior 18 months, and standardized by the value of own current volume. 
DTRADE
t
4it i tRET RET , −L  is the 
market-adjusted cumulative return in the six-month period  through t 4t − . Capitalization groups 
are quintiles, with group 5 the largest. All regression contains dummies for each time period (not 
shown); p-values, which are in parenthesis, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation.     
 
 
In summarizing the six-month and three-month results, the variables of current 
, , and SKEW SIGMA RET  are shown to be statistically significantly related to the 
skewness in the following period. In general, the model we tested has shown better 
performance with data measured over a three-month period and for the period from 
1990 to 2001. For smaller-cap firms categorized in size 1 and 2, the trading pattern in 
the current period also matters systematically in forecasting the skewness in the next 
period. These observations are robust in the choice of the length of groupings of data 
and the choice of the proxy variable to represent difference of opinions as either 
DTURNOVER  or  in our research. DTRADE
 
5.3 Effects of Regulatory Change 
 
We have a good opportunity to test the effects of a change in regulations on 
short-selling. In February 2002, new guidelines were enacted requiring a short sale to be 
on an up-tick when markets were in down trend. That is, the short-sale had to be at a 
price higher than the previous trade. Prior regulations allowed shorting at the same price 
as the previous trade.11 The background of this change was alleged misconduct by 
several brokerage firms in the preceding several months. At the same time, at the 
request of the Financial Service Agency (FSA), the share-lending system was reviewed 
by firms engaged in lending. The FSA asked that changes be made so that borrowers 
bore the relevant costs. For example, Japan Securities Finance Co., Ltd, introduced new 
fees for stock-lending, starting from May 7, 2002. The direction of this change is 
obvious, so we tested its effects.  
     The data between June 2000 and November 2003 are sorted according to the 
period before and after the change.12 To check whether skewness and associated 
relationships of the variables differ between these two sub periods, first statistics are 
calculated, then regressions are conducted.  
In Table 10, measures indicating asymmetry all have higher values after the 
regulatory change, but these are not decisive if we consider the size of the standard 
deviation. Interesting results are obtained in the three regression analyses summarized 
in Table 11.  
As in previous examinations, general observations on variables , , itSKEW itSIGMA
RET  and , hold in a similar way. The results regarding the role of trading 
variables are very impressive; it appears that the proposed model fits better in the period 
itLOGSIZE
                                                 
11The United States has long had such an "up-tick" rule. This new rule was effective since March 6, 
2002. 
12Note that the whole sample period here corresponds to the data after the full deregulation of 
brokerage fees. 
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after the regulatory change, with statistical significance higher for both  




Table 10. Summary Statistics: three-month period with the regulatory change 
 
 00/6-02/2 02/3-03/11 00/6-03/11  
tSKEW  Mean 0.206 0.319 0.269   
       S.D. 0.745  0.808  0.770   
tDUVOL  Mean 0.135  0.241  0.190   
         S.D. 0.472  0.505  0.486   
tDMA  Mean 0.000  0.001  0.000   
      S.D. 0.003  0.003  0.003   
tDOUT  Mean 0.003  0.004  0.003   
       S.D. 0.012  0.012  0.012   
tSIGMA  Mean 0.028  0.026  0.026   
        S.D. 0.014  0.014  0.014   
tLOGSIZE  Mean 10.698  10.509  10.607   
          S.D. 1.595  1.669  1.632   
tTURNOVER  Mean 0.04  0.067  0.051   
            S.D. 0.081  0.128  0.101   
tDTURNOVER
Mean 
0.001  0.009  0.004   
S.D. 0.045  0.07  0.056   
tTRADE  Mean 544761  780089  647387   
        S.D. 1306782  2039382  1658209   
tDTRADE  Mean -0.116  -0.011  -0.067   
          S.D. 0.473  0.439  0.468   
tRET  Mean 0.025  0.018  0.021   
     S.D. 0.196  0.205  0.194   
No.of obs 5,882  5,403  13,430   
 
NOTE: The sample period is June 2000 to November 2003.  is the coefficient of skewness, 
measured using market-adjusted daily returns in the three-month period t.  is the log of 
the ratio of up-day to down-day standard deviation, measured using market-adjusted returns in the 
three-month period.  is the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns measured 
in the three-month period t.  is the log of the market capitalization measured at the end 
of period t.  is an average monthly turnover measured in the three-month period t.  






tDTURNOVER t is 
average daily trading volume in the three-month period t, detrended by a moving average of trading 
volume in the prior 9 months, and standardized by the value of own current volume. RETt is the 
market-adjusted cumulative return in the three-month period t. 
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Table 11. Pooled Regression: three-month period 
 - Before and After Regulatory Change - 
 










00/6~   
03/11  
tSKEW   0.035  0.017  0.038  0.036  0.021  0.039   
 (0.053)  (0.320) (0.001) (0.047) (0.199)  (0.000)   
tSIGMA   9.646  9.720  7.714  9.526  8.565  7.451   
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   
tDTOVER   -0.364  -0.745 -0.364 -  -  -   
 (0.260)  (0.001) (0.049) -  -  -   
tDTRADE   -  -  -  -0.038 -0.084  -0.043   
 -  -  -  (0.238) (0.048)  (0.059)   
tRET   -0.250  -0.108 -0.180 -0.245 -0.158  -0.187   
 (0.000)  (0.151) (0.000) (0.001) (0.036)  (0.000)   
1tRET −   -0.071  -0.495 -0.218 -0.073 -0.530  -0.227   
 (0.318)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.290) (0.000)  (0.000)   
2tRET −   -0.058  -0.348 -0.171 -0.066 -0.373  -0.179   
 (0.386)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.337) (0.000)  (0.000)   
tLOGSIZE  -0.046  -0.070 -0.048 -0.045 -0.072  -0.047   
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   
No. of obs.  4,637  4,274  12,059 4,637  4,274  12,059   
Adjusted 2R  0.068  0.087  0.090  0.068  0.086  0.090   
 
NOTE: The total sample period is from June 2000 to November 2003. The dependent variable is 
, the coefficient of skewness, measured using market-adjusted daily returns in the 
six-month period .  is the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns 
measured in the six-month period t . 
1i tSKEW , +
1t + itSIGMA
DTURNOVER  is average monthly turnover in the 
six-month period , detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior 18 months. 
 is average daily trading volume in the six-month period , detrended by a moving 




1it i tRET RET , −,  and 2i tRET , −  are the market-adjusted cumulative return in the 
six-month period t through . All regression contains dummies for each time period (not 




Because the proposed theoretical model requires any elements to cause 
asymmetry in the return distribution, the new regulation on short-selling seems to work 
as an institutional constraint, as the theory presumes. It should be noted that conditional 
skewness appeared negatively related to the preceding de-trended trading variable, but 





6 Concluding Remarks and Future Agenda 
 
Although it is well known that the market rate of return tends to show negative 
skewness, the return distribution of individual stocks has shown positive skewness for 
several sub groupings. This observation is consistent with the results reported on US 
capital markets as found in Duffee (1995), CHS (2001) and others. Our analysis here 
contributes to demonstrating important similarities in the firm-level distribution of 
returns in the principal Japanese markets. Positive skewness in the returns is more 
evident for smaller firms. Although CHS (2001) suggest that managers of smaller firms 
have greater flexibility regarding disclosure, more detailed analysis on why such 
positive skewness arises is needed.  
     From the analysis of pooled cross-section data of individual stocks, we find clear 
evidence of predictive power in the information preceding time  for the skewness in 
period . Specifically, the greater the volatility and skewness in the current period, 
the greater the value of the skewness in the following period. Also, the up trends in own 
returns in the preceding periods may explain a rather negatively skewed return 
distribution in the following period. These results are significantly shown for the whole 
sample period from 1980 to 2001, as well as for two sub periods.  
t
1t +
     The Hong and Stein model predicts a relation between turnover and skewness. As 
to the explanatory power of preceding trading activity, our analysis shows inconclusive 
results for the return distribution of individual stocks listed on the first and second 
sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Such asymmetry can be partly accounted for by 
the divergence of trading volume from trend. However, the effects of the variable 
DTURNOVER  and TR  seem to be not so robust as such other variables as own 
skewness, volatility, and cumulative rate of return in the preceding period. Still, 
systematic relations to the skewness measured over both a three-month and a six-month 
period were more evident in trading variables for small firms in the 1990s through 2001. 
In this regard, we note the difference in share ownership structure between large and 
small firms, yet exact logic is not well identified.  
ADE
     The regulatory change in short-selling that took place in February 2002 appears to 
have enhanced this negative relation between the size of the value of skewness in the 
following period and current trading proxies. This suggests that institutional framework 
is regarded as an important factor to be related to the pattern of return distribution of 
individual stocks.  
     Overall, our empirical analysis suggests that there is strong evidence that lagged 
volatility, skewness and returns predict skewness in the current period. Conditional 
skewness appears partly explained by previous detrended trading proxies, however, the 
results are not conclusive and the mechanism that creates positive skewness in 
individual stock returns was not well identified. Our application of the Hong and Stein 
model to Japanese data does not contracted it, but this is not the same as a definitive 
support. Further research, both empirical and theoretical, is required.  
  
 26
Appendix : Contemporaneous Correlation (1990-2001): six-month period  
 
 tSKEW  tDUVOL  tDMA  tDOUT tSIGMA tLSIZE tDTOVER tTOVER tDTRADE tRET  
PANEL A           
tSKEW   1           
tDUVOL   0.874  1          
tDMA   0.540  0.800  1         
tDOUT   0.665  0.660  0.415 1        
tSIGMA   0.092  0.159  0.225 0.118 1       
tLOGSIZE   -0.178  -0.188  -0.152 -0.163 -0.441 1      
tDTURNOVER  0.093  0.146  0.177 0.090 0.224 -0.039 1     
tTURNOVER   0.122  0.206  0.257 0.117 0.346 -0.152 0.599  1    
tDTRADE   0.120  0.167  0.166 0.104 0.112 0.116 0.586  0.204  1   
tRET   0.232  0.269  0.243 0.170 -0.099 0.057 0.249  0.128  0.252  1   
PANEL B           
1tSKEW +   0.136  0.150  0.124 0.122 0.170 -0.182 0.002  0.039  0.003  -0.057  
1tDUVOL +   0.163  0.190  0.167 0.145 0.217 -0.195 0.026  0.084  0.027  -0.058  
1tDMA +   0.138  0.163  0.154 0.123 0.222 -0.159 0.047  0.116  0.048  -0.049  
1tDOUT +   0.128  0.145  0.121 0.121 0.153 -0.168 0.011  0.041  0.008  -0.053  
1tSIGMA +   0.067  0.091  0.131 0.056 0.611 -0.427 0.057  0.174  -0.024  -0.202  
1tLOGSIZE +   -0.177  -0.182  -0.145 -0.167 -0.473 0.985 -0.004  -0.126  0.128  0.092  
1tDTURNOVER +  0.032  0.019  0.000 0.024 0.018 -0.038 0.128  -0.193  0.116  0.071  
1tTURNOVER +   0.106  0.158  0.177 0.098 0.253 -0.169 0.272  0.578  0.104  0.083  
1tDTRADE +   -0.030  -0.058  -0.057 -0.036 -0.049 0.113 0.136  -0.216  0.248  0.064  
1tRET +   -0.044  -0.060  -0.072 -0.034 -0.027 0.034 -0.032  -0.108  0.009  -0.010  
NOTE: The same notes apply as Table 1.   
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